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The free rider problem is one of the most well studied problems in economics. The solution
proposed mainly is punitive in order to deter people from free riding. In this work we introduce
quantum strategies and also study the problem by using the mathematical structure of 1D Ising
model in the infinite player limit. We observe that for maximum entanglement the quantum
strategy is always the equilibrium solution, i.e., the strategy chosen by majority of the players
independent of the payoffs, solving the free rider problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In economics, the public goods game is typically used
to investigate cooperative behavior. In the public goods
game, a resource is produced which is perfectly share-
able, and once produced can be utilized by all in a com-
munity. In a community, the number of members can
be quite large, thus can be taken as infinite or the ther-
modynamic limit. Since the resource is a public good,
people have less of an incentive to provide than to free
ride, known as the well-known free rider problem. This
problem, in the thermodynamic limit, is usually tackled
numerically [1]. In a recent work [2], the classical two-
player public goods was extended to the thermodynamic
limit and solved analytically. In this paper, the similarity
between 1D Ising model and game theory in the thermo-
dynamic limit, as established in Refs. [2–4] is used to
derive the equilibrium strategy for the quantum public
goods game in the thermodynamic limit.
We use the same technique as used in Refs. [2–4], where
sites are replaced by players and the spin states at each
site are analogous to the player’s strategic choices. Simi-
lar to Ising model, magnetization in the thermodynamic
limit of a game is defined as the difference in fraction of
players choosing strategy, say s1 over s2. We first review
the analogies between two spin Ising Hamiltonian and
a two-player game and then extend it to the thermody-
namic limit. The public goods game is then quantized
using Eisert’s scheme[5] and the payoffs corresponding
to the strategies be it quantum or classical are calcu-
lated. The quantum public goods game is then extended
to the thermodynamic limit by considering the strategies
quantum versus classical, i.e., quantum versus provide or
quantum versus free ride. We see that for the quantum
public goods game, quantum and provide are equally pos-
sible. Further, when quantum goes against free ride, an
interesting feature emerges, for the maximally entangled
case, the majority always chooses the quantum strategy
and do not free ride, independent of the payoffs. We also
check the behavior of quantum Nash equilibrium as the
amount of entanglement in a site is changed.
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This paper is organized as follows- in section IA, we
explain the 1D Ising model and the connection between
a two spin Ising Hamiltonian and the payoffs of a classi-
cal two-player two-strategy game as was done in Ref. [6].
The thermodynamic limit of the game is also defined as
was done in Refs. [2, 4]. Next, the public goods game is
quantized using Eisert’s scheme[5] and the Nash equilib-
rium strategy is calculated for the quantum public goods
game. We plot the difference in the fraction of players
choosing a particular strategy versus the entanglement γ
at a particular site and observe phase transitions. Inter-
estingly, we find that in the quantum public goods games
when the entanglement between the players in a particu-
lar site is maximal, the overwhelming majority of players
choose the quantum strategy independent of the payoffs.
A. Mapping classical game payoffs to Ising
parameters
In statistical physics, 1D Ising model[7] represents a
system of spins arranged on a line which can be in either
of two states −1 (down-spin:↓) or +1 (up-spin:↑) and
only interact with their nearest neighbors. The 1D Ising
Hamiltonian is given as-
H = −J
N∑
i=1
σiσi+1 − h
N∑
i=1
σi, (1)
J denotes the spin-spin coupling, h represents the applied
magnetic field and the spins are represented by σ’s while
i denotes the site index. Using Hamiltonian Eq. (1), one
can derive the magnetzation which is-
m =
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
. (2)
An 1D Ising system with two spins can be mapped to a
two-player game as has been shown in Refs. [3, 6]. The
payoffs for two-player game can be written in matrix form
as-
U =
 s1 s2s1 a, a′ b, b′
s2 c, c
′ d, d′
 , (3)
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2wherein U(si, sj) denotes the payoff function and a, b, c, d
denote payoffs for row player while a′, b′, c′, d′ denote the
payoffs for column player. s1 and s2 represent the strate-
gic choices made by the two-players. Following on from
Refs. [2, 3, 6], the Ising game matrix is defined as the
energy states of the two site Ising chain- s2 = +1 s2 = −1s1 = +1 J + h −J + h
s1 = −1 −J − h J − h
 . (4)
with s1, s2 being the spin states at the two sites. The
players are analogous to the sites whereas their strate-
gic choices are analogous to spins in Ising model. One
can map Eq. (4) to Eq. (3) and then get J, h in terms
of a, b, c, d, thus going to the thermodynamic limit of the
game, since the magnetzation for the infinite site 1D Ising
model is derived in terms of the Ising parameters J, h.
Thus for the game matrix in the infinite site (or ther-
modynamic) limit, the spin-spin coupling J and external
magnetic field h are given as-
J =
a− c+ d− b
4
, h =
a− c+ b− d
4
. (5)
in terms of payoffs of a general two-player game. The
magnetization, i.e., the difference in average number of
players choosing strategy s1 against the average number
of players choosing s2, from Eq. (2) in the thermody-
namic limit with J and h, as in Eq. (5) can then be
written as-
m =
sinh(β a−c+b−d4 )√
sinh2(β a−c+b−d4 ) + e
−β(a−c+d−b)
. (6)
Decreasing β (implies increasing temperature) in Ising
model increases the disorderness in orientation of the
spins. Thus, decreasing β in the magnetization of game
theory, Eq. (2) increases randomness in a player’s strate-
gic choices. For connecting quantum public goods game
with 1D Ising model we proceed as follows. We first quan-
tize the classical public goods game and then remodel the
1D Ising spin chain incorporating entanglement at each
site.
II. PUBLIC GOODS GAME
The public goods game or the ”free rider problem” is
a social dilemma game [8, 9]. In the two-player pub-
lic goods game, the ”public good” is produced by either
player alone by paying the entire cost of the good or both
of the players pay for half of the good. The payoffs for
the cooperators (provider) and defectors (free rider) [3, 8]
are given as-
PD = kncc/N, PC = PD − c, (7)
where c is the cost of the good, k denotes the multiplica-
tion factor of the ”public good”, N denotes the number
of players in the group (in the two-player public goods
game, N = 2), and nc denotes the number of coopera-
tors in the group. The punishment p is introduced such
that whenever a player defects or free rides he has an
additional negative payoff given by −p. Thus, the payoff
matrix can be written as is-
U =
 provide free rideprovide 2r, 2r r − c2 , r + c2 − p
free ride r + c2 − p, r − c2 −p,−p
 ,
(8)
where r, c, p > 0. As we can see from the payoff matrix
Eq. (8), when r > c/2−p, then cooperation or provide is
the Nash equilibrium but when r < c/2−p then defection
or free riding is the Nash equilibrium. When p = 0, the
above game Eq. (8) reduces to public goods game with-
out punishment. Note: Although in this work we only
consider the thermodynamic or infinite player limit our
results are equally valid for a mena field model with con-
siderably lesser number of players. Since our approach is
based on the 1D Ising model, we would look at the sce-
nario in the same context to figure out the N where our
results would also be valid in the mean field case. From
ID Ising model, the partition function is given by
Z = λN+ + λ
N
− = λ
N
+ (1 + α)
where λ± = cosh(βh) ±
√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ are the
eigenvalues of the transfer matrix (see Ref. [7] for details
regarding the derivation of the partition function for Ising
model) and α = (λ−λ+ )
N . Since, the relation λ− < λ+ is
always true, thus for large enough N , Z = λN+ . Now,
Taking log on both sides,
N log(
λ−
λ+
) = log(α) =⇒ N = − log(α)/ log(λ+
λ−
)
Now, for our approach to be valid α → 0. Thus, the
analytic approach is valid for any N such that α could
be neglected which depends on βh and βJ . For example
if J = 1.5/β, h = 0.3/β, then say for α = 10−6, we get
N ∼ 20 which means the mean field limit is reached for
no. of sites N > 20. Now since we have a one to one
correspondence between the Ising model and our public
goods game, substituting the Ising parameters J and h
in terms of the game payoffs as derived in Eq. (5) above
and a very small value for α = 10−6, then
3N = − log(α)/ log(
cosh(β a−c+b−d4 ) +
√
sinh2(β a−c+b−d4 ) + e
−β(a−c+d−b)
cosh(β a−c+b−d4 )−
√
sinh2(β a−c+b−d4 ) + e
−β(a−c+d−b)
) (9)
We have the payoffs a, b, c, d for the public goods
game given by a = 2 ∗ reward/β, b = (reward −
cost/2)/β, c = (reward − punishment + cost/2)/β, d =
−punishment/β. Taking reward = 1, cost = 4 and
punishment = 0, we have: N ∼ 15. This gives the mean
field limit for the game can be reached with around 15
sites[10].
A. Mapping quantum public goods game payoffs to
Ising parameters
To quantize the classical two-player public goods game,
we use the scheme proposed by Eisert, et. al., see [5] in
the context of Prisoner’s dilemma. The two-players are
represented by two qubits while the strategies they adopt
are represented by the state of the qubits. The coopera-
tion or provide strategy is represented as |0〉 while defect
or free ride strategy is represented as |1〉. Entanglement
in the game is introduced by an operator L which entan-
gles the state of the qubits. L is given by-
L =

cos(γ/2) 0 0 i sin(γ/2)
0 cos(γ/2) −i sin(γ/2) 0
0 −i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2) 0
i sin(γ/2) 0 0 cos(γ/2)

with γ representing the amount of entanglement between
qubits. γ = 0 implies no entanglement while γ = pi/2 de-
fines a maximally entangled state at each site. Thus,
the initial state after action of L on |00〉 is given as-
|ψw〉 = cos(γ/2)|00〉 + i sin(γ/2)|11〉, where the sub-
script w indicates site index. Players choose a particular
strategy by applying the unitary operator O(θ, φ) on the
initial state |ψw〉, wherein
O(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
− sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
)
. (10)
The final state which results from the action of disentan-
glement operator L† and the unitaries O(θi, φi), i = A,B
representing the strategies of players/qubits A and B is-
|χw〉 = L†O(θA, φA)⊗O(θB , φB)L|00〉 (11)
The classical public goods game payoffs are given in
Eq. (8). The payoffs for players A and B are then calcu-
lated using the classical public goods game payoffs as-
$A = 2r|〈00|χw〉|2 + (r + c
2
− p)|〈10|χw〉|2
+(r − c
2
)|〈01|χw〉|2 − p|〈11|χw〉|2, for player A,
$B = 2r|〈00|χw〉|2 + (r − c
2
)|〈10|χw〉|2
+(r +
c
2
− p)|〈01|χw〉|2 − p|〈11|χw〉|2, for player B.
The provide operation is defined by identity matrix as in
Eq. 10, while free ride is defined by X. The quantization
procedure allows us to introduce the quantum strategy
given by Q = iZ = O(0, pi/2). The new payoff matrix
including the quantum strategy is-
U =

provide free ride Q
provide 2r, 2r r − c
2
, r + c
2
− p α1, α1
free ride r + c
2
− p, r − c
2
−p,−p α2, α3
Q α1, α1 α3, α2 2r, 2r

(12)
wherein α1 = 2r cos2(γ)−p sin2(γ), α2 = r− c2 cos(2γ)−
p sin2(γ) and α3 = r + c2 cos(2γ) − p cos2(γ). For max-
imally entangled state, γ = pi2 , the payoff matrix taking
reward:r = 1, cost c = 4 and punishment p = 0, i.e.,
quantum public goods game without punishment is-
U =

provide free ride Q
provide 2, 2 −1, 3 0, 0
free ride 3,−1 0, 0 3,−1
Q 0, 0 −1, 3 2, 2
 (13)
The Nash equilibrium for the quantum public goods
game without punishment, as seen from Eq. (13) for max-
imal entanglement is (freeride, freeride). On the other
hand, the payoff matrix for quantum public goods game
with punishment, taking reward r = 1, cost c = 4 and
punishment p = 1, for maximal entanglement is-
U =

provide free ride Q
provide 2, 2 −1, 2 −1,−1
free ride 2,−1 −1,−1 2,−1
Q −1,−1 −1, 2 2, 2
 (14)
The Nash equilibrium for the quantum public goods
game with punishment, as seen from Eq. (14) for max-
imal entanglement is (Q,Q). Remarkably, in the next
section we will see that regardless of punishment in the
thermodynamic limit, quantum is the equilibrium solu-
tion.
4III. QUANTUM PUBLIC GOODS GAME IN
THE THERMODYNAMIC LIMIT
We extend the two-player Quantum public goods
game, discussed in the previous section, to the thermody-
namic limit via a mapping to the Ising model as discussed
in section IA. We use a similar approach as in Ref. [9]
wherein each Ising site consists of an entangled pair and
different sites interact via classical couplings J . In Fig. 1,
a schematic diagram is shown where at each site a two-
player quantum public goods game is played. In classical
Ising model, the applied magnetic field h aligns the spins
onto a specific orientation, similarly in quantum public
goods game in the thermodynamic limit, h plays the role
of an external parameter which creates a bias in player’s
choices for the infinite-site(thermodynamic limit) quan-
tum game. Since, in Ising model the sites can have only
two states, we have each player in a game with access
to either a classical or quantum strategy, see Eq. (10).
We solve for the thermodynamic limit of the game and
find the magnetization Eq. (2) when classical and quan-
tum strategies are adopted at each site. As was argued
FIG. 1. The quantum public goods game is played at each
site in the 1D Ising model. At each of the w sites a two-player
quantum public goods game is played on an entangled state
|ψw〉. The yellow line represents the classical coupling J . The
other Ising parameter h which is the external magnetic field,
plays the role of aligning various sites towards a particular
strategy.
in Ref. [9], and since we want to investigate the classical
strategies versus quantum, we break Eq. (12) into two
separate 2 × 2 games and first analyze quantum versus
provide strategy and then the quantum versus free ride
strategy.
1. Quantum versus Provide
As discussed in section I A we calculate the magnetiza-
tion for the case when players can choose either quantum
(Q = iZ) or provide (C = I) strategies. Thus, the pay-
offs from Eq. (12) for the row player (the column player’s
payoffs can be deduced from Eq. (12) is-
U =
 provide Qprovide 2r 2r cos2(γ)− p sin2(γ)
Q 2r cos2(γ)− p sin2(γ) 2r
 .
(15)
From the payoff matrix, it can be inferred that there
are two Nash equilibrium- both choose provide or both
choose quantum. To make the connection with Ising
game matrix, see Eq. (4), we transform the matrix as
given above using the method explained in section 1A,
thus J = (2r+p) sin
2(γ)
2 and h = 0. The magnetization
then is-
m =
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
= 0. (16)
As we can see for the thermodynamic limit of quantum
public goods game when the players have access to quan-
tum or provide strategies, the magnetization becomes 0.
This means that there are equal proportions of players
choosing quantum and provide strategy and thus can be
concluded that players equally choose between quantum
and provide strategy. This is similar to the two-player
version.
2. Quantum versus Free ride
As discussed in section I A we calculate the magneti-
zation for the case when players make either quantum
(Q = iZ) or free ride (freeride = X) as their strategic
choices. The payoff matrix in this case is given by-
U =
 Q freerideQ 2r 2r−c cos(2γ)−2p sin2(γ)
2
freeride 2r+c cos(2γ)−2p cos
2(γ)
2
−p

(17)
The Nash equilibrium in this case as can be seen from
Eq. (16) depends on γ. For r > c2 cos(2γ) − p sin2(γ),
the Nash equilibrium is both players choosing quantum.
However, when r < c2 cos(2γ)− p sin2(γ), the Nash equi-
librium is both players choosing to free ride or defect. As
derived in section 1A, the Ising parameters further are
J = 0 and h =
r− c2 cos(2γ)+p cos2(γ)
2 . The magnetization
is then-
m =
sinh(βh)√
sinh2(βh) + e−4βJ
,
or, m = tanh(β(
r − c2 cos(2γ) + p cos2(γ)
2
)). (18)
The quantum strategy reduces to the provide or co-
operation strategy when γ = 0 for public goods game
with punishment. Thus, for γ = 0, magnetzation from
Eq. (18) is-
m = tanh(β(
r + p
2
− c
4
)).
5FIG. 2. magnetzation versus γ for r = 1, c = 4 and p = 0 for
different β′s. For the maximally entangled case i.e. γ = pi/2,
the magnetzation always turns out to be positive independent
of r, c, p and β.
FIG. 3. magnetzation versus γ for r = 1, c = 4 and β = 1 for
different p.
which is the same equation for the classical public goods
game with punishment in the thermodynamic limit as
was derived in Ref. [2]. A phase transition for the quan-
tum public goods game with punishment would occur
when-
r − c
2
cos(2γ) + p cos2(γ) = 0, i.e., cos2(γ) =
2r + c
2(c− p) .
(19)
From Eq. (19) the phase transition occurs at γ =
cos−1
√
(1 + 2)/4 = pi/6 (for r = 1, c = 4 and p = 0)
as can be clearly seen from Fig 2. From Fig 3, we see
that as the punishment p increases for all values of γ,
the majority of population would always choose quan-
tum. Further, it should be noted from Eq. (18) that
the magnetization always comes out to be non-negative
when γ = pi/2 independent of payoffs in Eq. (8) as for
public goods game r > 0. Thus, independent of the re-
ward, cost or punishment, majority of the players always
opt for the Quantum strategy. From Fig 2, it can be
inferred that when β increases and the magnetzation is
positive, the fraction of players choosing quantum strat-
egy also increases. However, when magnetzation is neg-
ative, the fraction of defectors increases as β increases.
When β → 0, the players tend to become unbiased and
equally choose both strategies.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this work was to extend the two-player pub-
lic goods game to the thermodynamic limit and derive the
strategy adopted by the majority of players. We observe
that in the thermodynamic limit, the provide and quan-
tum strategy are always equi-probable and the players are
unbiased towards either of the choices. However, for the
case when players are allowed to choose either free ride or
quantum strategy, a phase transition can be seen when
the entanglement present at each site increases. Further,
for the maximally entangled case, the majority of play-
ers always opt for quantum strategy and do not free ride
given any cost or punishment. Thus we can with con-
fidence conclude that when the players are allowed to
opt for quantum strategy, free riding in a population de-
creases thereby, solving the free-riding problem in public
goods game. Our work to derive analytically in the ther-
modynamic limit a measure for the fraction of providers
against the fraction of free riders can also be extended
when there are loners too as in Ref.[11] by invoking a
mapping to a spin-1 Ising model will be attempted soon.
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